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An Examination
of Treasury Term 
Investment Interest Rates
1. Introduction
he Term Investment Option (TIO) program is a cash 
management tool of the U.S. Treasury Department. 
Through TIO, which is part of the broader Treasury Tax and 
Loan (TT&L) program, the Treasury lends funds to depository 
institutions for a set number of days. The rate that the Treasury 
receives is determined via a single-rate auction format. 
An important issue in TIO auctions is whether the interest 
rates received by the Treasury are comparable to market rates. 
In this article, we compare TIO rates with rates on mortgage-
backed-security (MBS) repurchase (repo) agreements. MBS 
repo rates are the closest benchmark for TIO rates in several 
respects: depository institutions can obtain funds using both 
types of transactions, the transactions are collateralized, and 
the eligible collateral is similar. We study the 166 auctions held 
from November 2003, when TIO first became an official 
Treasury cash management facility, to February 2006.1
1TIO began as a pilot in April 2002. We do not examine the first twenty-seven 
auctions from April 2002 to October 2003. The structure of the 166 auctions 
we study is similar to the structure of future TIO auctions. During the TIO 
pilot, auctions tended to be held in the latter part of the year, so there were 
extended periods with no auctions. 
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• The U.S. Treasury, through its Term 
Investment Option (TIO) program, lends 
excess cash balances to banks at interest 
rates determined by single-rate auctions. 
￿ An important issue in TIO auctions is whether 
the Treasury receives a market rate of return 
on TIO funds.
￿ An analysis of the spread between rates on 
TIO auctions and rates on mortgage-backed-
security (MBS) repos suggests that for small 
auction sizes, TIO rates are comparable to 
market rates, except on offerings with term 
lengths of fewer than five days. 
￿ The study also finds that a more compressed 
auction schedule, in which the Treasury 
announces and auctions TIO funds on the 
same day, does not adversely affect TIO rates; 
thus, banks appear to be indifferent to more 
advance notice of auctions. 
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TIO auctions can shed light on bidding behavior in general, 
because they vary along more dimensions than traditional 
Treasury debt auctions. For example, TIO auctions are not held on 
a regular basis and their size and term length vary. Typical 
Treasury debt auctions, by comparison, are held on a regular 
schedule,2 and the amount auctioned is usually the only variable. 
A key finding of our work is that for small auction sizes, 
TIO interest rates are fairly comparable to MBS repo rates for 
term lengths of five days or more. However, shorter term 
lengths result in the Treasury receiving lower TIO rates relative 
to market rates. We also observe a negative relationship 
between the size of an auction and the spread between the TIO 
rate and the MBS repo rate. Finally, a more compressed auction 
schedule, in which the Treasury announces and auctions TIO 
funds on the same day, does not adversely affect TIO rates. This 
finding suggests that banks are indifferent to more advance 
notice of TIO auctions.
Our study proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide 
background information on the TT&L program, term 
investments, and repo transactions. Our data and our 
regression framework are presented in Section 3, while 
regression results can be found in Section 4. In Section 5, 
we draw conclusions.
2.B a c k g r o u n d
2.1 The Treasury Tax and Loan Program
Treasury funds are held either at Federal Reserve Banks (the 
Fed balance) or private depository institutions in what is 
known as the Treasury Tax and Loan program (see Garbade, 
Partlan, and Santoro [2004] for a discussion of recent 
innovations in Treasury cash management). The Fed balance 
does not earn explicit interest,3 while balances held at private 
depository institutions, which can be withdrawn on demand, 
earn the TT&L rate, which is the weekly average overnight 
federal funds rate less 25 basis points.4 Depository institutions 
specify the maximum TT&L balances they are willing to hold, 
and the balances must be collateralized. If balances exceed the 
lesser of the specified limit or the collateral value of assets 
2For example, four-, thirteen-, and twenty-six-week Treasury bills are 
auctioned every week. 
3As funds in the Fed balance reduce the supply of bank reserves, open market 
operations to purchase Treasury securities are required to offset this drain. The 
interest earned on these securities is included in Federal Reserve earnings, 
which are remitted weekly to the Treasury. Thus, implicit interest is earned by 
the Treasury on the Fed balance.
pledged by the institution, the excess is transferred to a 
Treasury account at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
There are three types of depository institutions in the TT&L 
program: collector institutions, which collect tax payments and 
transfer them to Treasury accounts at District Federal Reserve 
Banks; retainer institutions, which collect and hold funds until 
balances exceed their limit or collateral or until the Treasury 
withdraws the funds; and investor institutions, which are 
similar to retainer institutions but also accept direct 
placements of funds from the Treasury.
The management of Treasury funds directly affects the 
conduct of monetary policy, as the net movement of funds into 
and out of the banking sector generally has to be offset by open 
market operations. Payments by the U.S. government are made 
from the Fed balance, while some tax receipts flow directly into 
the Fed balance. Depository institutions in the TT&L program 
collect the bulk of tax receipts. The Fed balance fluctuates daily 
as tax payments are received and outlays are paid. An increase 
in the Fed balance drains reserves available in the banking 
system, while a decrease adds them. The Treasury typically 
seeks to maintain a relatively stable Fed balance of $5 billion, 
with the remainder of its funds held at private depository 
institutions. The target balance is achieved through with-
drawals from and deposits to the depository institutions. The 
maintenance of a stable Fed balance prevents changes in the 
balance from affecting the supply of bank reserves and 
minimizes the need for offsetting open market operations. 
Assets acceptable as collateral in the TT&L program range 
from Treasury securities to insured student loans (Table 1). 
A lower collateral value is assigned to less liquid and less 
creditworthy assets.5 Collateral must be held either at a Federal 
Reserve Bank or at a Treasury-approved third-party 
4The weekly average rate is computed for a seven-day interval, beginning on a 
Thursday and ending the following Wednesday, with the rate for a Saturday, 
Sunday, or holiday taken as the rate for the preceding business day. The weekly 
average rate less 25 basis points is used to calculate a daily interest factor that is 
applied to the daily average amount of TT&L balances for each Thursday-
Wednesday cycle, and interest is payable on the following Thursday.
The management of Treasury funds 
directly affects the conduct of monetary 
policy, as the net movement of funds
into and out of the banking sector 
generally has to be offset by open
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custodian.6 During months with heavy tax inflows, balances at 
depository institutions can exceed available collateral, resulting 
5Refer to <http://www.easysaver.gov/instit/statreg/collateral/
collateral_taxandloantablel.pdf> for the margins applied to the 
various types of collateral.
in a transfer of these excess funds to the Fed balance and 
potentially causing the balance to exceed the $5 billion target. 
6Depository institutions can serve as third-party custodians; currently, 
the Depository Trust Company is the only non-depository institution 
approved by the Treasury.
Table 1
Acceptable and Unacceptable Collateral in the Treasury Tax and Loan Program
Panel A: Acceptable Collateral
Category 1 Obligations issued and fully insured or guaranteed by the U.S. government or a U.S. government agency. (See Category 4 for insured or
  guaranteed educational loans.)
Category 2 Obligations of government-sponsored enterprises and government-sponsored corporations of the United States that under specific statute
  may be accepted as security for public funds.
Category 3 Obligations issued or fully guaranteed by international development banks (acceptable only if denominated in U.S. dollars).
Category 4 Insured student loans or notes representing educational loans insured or guaranteed under a program authorized under Title IV of the
  Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, or Title VII of the Public Health Service Act, as amended. (Securities issued by the Student
  Loan Marketing Association are included in Category 2.)
Category 5 General obligations issued by the states of the United States and by Puerto Rico.
Category 6 Obligations of counties, cities, or other U.S. government authorities or instrumentalities that are not in default on payments on principal
  or interest and that may be purchased by banks as investment securities under the limitations established by appropriate
  federal bank regulatory agencies.
Category 7 Obligations of domestic corporations that may be purchased by banks as investment securities under the limitations established
  by appropriate federal bank regulatory agencies.
Category 8 Qualifying commercial paper, commercial and agricultural loans, and bankers’ acceptances approved by the Federal Reserve System at the
  direction of the Treasury.
Category 9 Qualifying publicly issued asset-backed securities that are Aaa/AAA rated by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating agency
  and approved by the Federal Reserve System at the direction of the Treasury.
Panel B: Unacceptable Collateral 
Common and preferred stock.




Obligations issued by the pledging bank or by affiliates of the pledging bank.
Obligations of foreign countries (that is, sovereign debt).
Collateralized bond obligations, collateralized loan obligations, and collateralized mortgage-backed securities except as otherwise noted.
Real estate mortgage-backed securities (one-to-four-family mortgages are acceptable only if held in a borrower-in-custody arrangement
  to secure special direct investments).
Panel C: Stripped and Zero-Coupon Securities
Securities offered in stripped, zero, or residual forms are acceptable only when market prices are available.
U.S. government agency securities may be stripped into their separate components and are acceptable only when market prices are available.
Source: U.S. Treasury Department (<http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/gsr/gsrttlaccxx0205.pdf>).22 An Examination of Treasury Term Investment Interest Rates
2.2 The Term Investment Option Program
The TIO program is another option within the TT&L program 
for placing Treasury funds with depository institutions. 
It began on a pilot basis in April 2002 and was expanded in 
November 2003.7 TIO offers greater certainty than the regular 
TT&L program about the amount of funds invested and the 
length of time funds will be invested.8 Participation is limited 
to TT&L depositories that have executed a TIO agreement.9 
The only publicly available information on the number of 
institutions in the TIO program is as of September 2004; at that 
time, forty-three institutions were participating.10 Depository 
institutions in the TIO program are not required to bid in TIO 
auctions, and the Treasury reserves the right not to place funds.
Depository institutions bid on TIO funds in auctions that 
follow a single-rate format. The identity of bidding institutions 
is known to the Treasury, but funds are allocated on the basis 
of auction bids. Participating institutions submit bids 
indicating the maximum rate they would pay on a specified 
quantity of funds. Institutions may submit multiple bids for 
differing amounts and rates.11 The interest rate that fills the 
auction, known as the stop-out rate, is determined, and this 
rate applies to all successful bids (those at or above the stop-
out rate). Bids at higher rates are filled in full and bids at the 
stop-out rate may be prorated. A single institution is limited 
to 50 percent of the announced amount.
One of the Treasury’s motivations for initiating TIO was to 
try to earn a market rate of return on its excess cash balances. 
On average, for the first 193 auctions TIO rates have been 
about 16 basis points higher than TT&L rates and 6.5 basis 
7TIO no. 28 was the first TIO auction after the program became an official cash 
management tool of the Treasury. 
8The Treasury reserves the right to call back funds placed in the TIO program 
before maturity, but it would be assessed a penalty in the form of interest. 
Moreover, such a call would likely result in reduced future participation in the 
program, and an early call has never occurred.
9All types of TT&L depositories (collector, retainer, and investor institutions) 
are eligible to participate in the TIO program.
10See <http://www.fms.treas.gov/tip/TIO-Presentation.ppt>. There are approxi-
mately 8,000 TT&L depositories.
11There is a $10 million minimum for bids. There is no limit on the number of 
bids that may be submitted by a single institution.
points lower than comparable MBS repo rates (the calculation 
is described below). 
Another motivation was to increase TT&L capacity 
following the federal budget surpluses of the late 1990s and 
2000-01. The surpluses occasionally resulted in Treasury 
balances available for investment with depository institutions 
exceeding TT&L collateral. As a result, Fed balances exceeded 
the $5 billion target and drained reserves from the banking 
system. Open market operations by the Federal Reserve were 
required to offset this drain. While federal budget surpluses are 
currently not an issue, TT&L capacity constraints are still 
important during months with large tax inflows, such as April. 
TIO collateral requirements are less restrictive than those 
for the regular TT&L program in the sense that collateral such 
as commercial loans can be held on the premises of the 
depository institution (or an affiliate) in a borrower-in-
custody arrangement instead of at a Federal Reserve Bank. 
While collateral held in such an arrangement is acceptable only 
on an auction-by-auction basis, these loans typically have been 
accepted since June 2002.12 
In the regular TT&L program, because commercial loans 
must generally be held at a Federal Reserve Bank, depositories 
are less likely to pledge these loans as collateral. As a result, even 
though depository institutions do not have to bring in new 
collateral to back term investments, allowing commercial loans 
to be held on depository premises leads institutions to bring in 
additional collateral that was previously unpledged. Capacity 
for the TT&L system as a whole is therefore increased. Require-
ments for all other collateral for TIO funds are similar to those 
for TT&L collateral: the collateral must be held either at a 
Federal Reserve Bank or at a Treasury-approved third-party 
custodian. 
According to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis, commercial loans comprise around 50 percent of 
collateral pledged in the TIO program; Treasury, federal 
agency, and corporate securities account for around 25 percent; 
mortgage-backed securities represent about 10 percent; 
and all other collateral make up the remaining 15 percent. 
The corresponding percentages for the regular TT&L program 
12See <http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/gsr/gsrcltio.htm> for information on 
acceptable collateral for the TIO program. 
After the TIO program became an official 
cash management tool, the Treasury 
began placing more term investments for 
greater cumulative and average amounts.
One of the Treasury’s motivations for 
initiating TIO [the Term Investment Option 
program] was to try to earn a market rate 
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are approximately 3 percent, 10 percent, 60 percent, and 
27 percent. 
The Treasury sponsored 193 term investments through 
February 2006.13 At that point, it faced a debt-limit crisis that 
13The last TIO auctioned in February 2006 was no. 194, but auction no. 173 was 
canceled “due to adjustments to cash balance projections” (<http://www
.fms.treas.gov/tip/auctions/HistoricalFinal05.pdf>).
was not resolved until March 20, 2006. No TIO auctions were 
held during this period, disrupting the typical schedule for 
these auctions.14 Chart 1 displays the number of investments 
each month since the program’s inception through February 
2006. Term investments generally were relegated to the latter 
half of the year for 2002 and 2003. After the TIO program 
became an official cash management tool, the Treasury began 
placing more term investments for greater cumulative 
(Chart 2) and average (Chart 3) amounts. Chart 4 shows 
that of the first 193 auctions, the largest single offering was 
$18 billion, with most offerings being less than $7 billion. Term 
lengths have varied from one day to as many as nineteen, but 
very few have been greater than fifteen days (Chart 5). 
While the main parameters of a TIO auction are under the 
Treasury’s control, in deciding the size and term length of a 
TIO auction the Treasury primarily relies on forecasts of future 
cash balances, which are dependent on forecasts of tax receipts 
and outlays. The Treasury also examines the expected forecast 
errors, which are based on historical data. Naturally, forecast 
errors for days further out are typically larger than errors over 
one or two days. Term investment parameters are chosen so 
that the Treasury’s remaining cash balances will likely be 
sufficient to maintain the $5 billion Fed balance target during 
the length of the term investment. As a result, TIO offering 
announcements provide insight into the Treasury’s anticipated 
14Term investments are typically made during the second half of a month 
(when receipts are greater) and in the first few days of the following month.24 An Examination of Treasury Term Investment Interest Rates
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cash balances and, by implication, the Treasury’s borrowing 
requirements. 
If receipts are weaker than anticipated or outlays stronger 
than anticipated, the Treasury can reduce the amount of funds 
that it auctions from the amount that was announced.15 In the 
extreme, the Treasury could auction no funds (that is, cancel 
an auction). The Treasury does not reduce auction sizes after 
announcement in response to expectations of interest rates. 
If receipts are stronger than forecasted or outlays weaker than 
forecasted, the Treasury cannot increase the size of a given 
auction after announcement. In the analysis below, auction size 
amounts are based on the announced auction size, not the 
actual amount that the Treasury auctions. The Treasury has 
never altered the announced term length of a given auction. 
15Other reasons why amounts placed can be less than amounts announced 
include collateral deficiencies and insufficient bids. Of the first 193 auctions, 
there were 9 occasions on which the amount placed was less than the amount 
announced. 
Our analysis would be more complex if the Treasury set the 
size and term length of TIO offerings based on rate-of-return 
considerations. If the Treasury did exercise this discretion, it 
may prefer to hold more (less) funds in regular TT&L balances 
when the federal funds rate is trading significantly higher 
(lower) than the target set by the Federal Open Market 
Committee. This is because a higher effective federal funds rate 
increases the TT&L rate. Table 2 presents simple regression 
results for 2004-05 relating the percentage of total Treasury 
funds held in the regular TT&L program with dummy variables 
for cases when, on the previous day, the effective federal funds 
rate traded 10 or more basis points higher or lower than the 
target.16 The results show that the dummy variable coefficients 
are not statistically significant; the Treasury does not hold more 
funds in regular TT&L balances (and less in TIO balances) 
when the federal funds rate is trading significantly higher 
than the target and vice versa. Therefore, even though the 
parameters of TIO auctions are under the Treasury’s control, 
these results suggest that they are not set based on rate-of-
return considerations.
Beginning in 2004, movements in term investment balances 
began to parallel closely movements in total TT&L balances, as 
the Treasury became more active in placing term investments. 
Chart 6 shows monthly average total TT&L balances divided into 
16The effective federal funds rate can be found at <http://www.newyorkfed 
.org>. Information on TT&L balances can be found in the Daily Treasury 
Statement (<http://www.fms.treas.gov/dts>).
The Treasury occasionally compressed 
the [auction] schedule into two days, 
announcing and auctioning on the same day 
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Monthly Average Treasury Tax and Loan (TT&L)
Program Balances
Source: Author’s calculations, based on U.S. Treasury Department, 








06            05 04 03 2002
Regular TT&L balances
Term investment option balances
Total TT&L balances
Billions of dollars
regular TT&L balances and TIO balances. During 2002 and 
2003, there is very little correlation between total TT&L balances 
and term investment balances. The correlation coefficient 
between the balances for 2002-03 is -.03, while the coefficient 
for 2004 is .79. The coefficient for 2005 is even higher, at .93.
For the time period studied here, the term investment 
auction process typically took place over three business days. 
This process is coordinated by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis as the fiscal agent for the Treasury:
￿ Day t: The Treasury announces that it will auction 
$X billion for Y days.
￿ Day t+1: Participating institutions bid on the funds and 
the Treasury announces the results.
￿ Day t+2: Funds are placed and the Fed balance falls by 
$X billion.
￿ Day t+2+Y: $X billion plus interest is returned to the Fed 
balance. 
The Treasury occasionally compressed the schedule into 
two days, announcing and auctioning on the same day and 
placing the funds the following day.17 A compressed schedule 
allows the Treasury to take into account more information on 
cash flows before deciding on the auction size. The Treasury 
has also occasionally auctioned two term investments of 
different amounts and lengths on the same day. 
17Since May 2006, the Treasury has moved to a standard process of announcing 
and auctioning TIO funds on the same day.
2.3 Repurchase Transactions
A repo is essentially a purchase and subsequent sale of an asset 
with the price differential reflecting the interest on the 
transaction. The transaction resembles a collateralized loan, as 
the lender of funds receives an asset as collateral to protect 
against default. A general collateral (GC) repo transaction does 
not involve a specific security within a class of securities, such 
as Treasury, federal agency, and mortgage-backed securities. 
For example, all Treasury bills, notes, and bonds (including 
inflation-indexed securities) are eligible for a GC Treasury repo 
transaction. GC repo rates are quoted for various lengths, such 
as overnight, one week, two weeks, and three weeks. 
TT&L depositories that participate in the TIO program and 
bid on TIO funds can also obtain funds via repos; therefore, 
repo rates can be considered a benchmark for TIO rates.18 
Acceptable collateral for mortgage-backed-security repos is 
also most similar to collateral pledged in the TIO program. 
Acceptable collateral for GC MBS repos consists of Treasury 
securities, non-mortgage-backed securities from agencies such as 
the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation, and mortgage-backed securities. 
18From the Treasury’s standpoint, the TT&L rate is the proper rate against 
which to compare the TIO rate because the TT&L rate represents what TIO 
funds would have earned had they not been placed in the TIO program. 
However, TT&L rates are not known at the time of TIO auctions. 
Table 2






1 (effective fed funds rate minus target t-1 > 9 bp) -0.02
(-0.559)




Notes: t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors. The number of observations is 503. The period 
examined is January 5, 2004, to December 30, 2005. TT&L is 
Treasury Tax and Loan program; bp is basis points.26 An Examination of Treasury Term Investment Interest Rates
Repos can settle either as a delivery-versus-payment (DVP) 
transaction or via a tri-party clearing arrangement. In the 
former, collateral and funds are exchanged directly between 
counterparties. In the latter, the transaction is conducted 
through a third-party clearing bank (see Garbade [2006, p. 38]). 
There are several benefits to a tri-party repo compared with a 
DVP repo. For example, in a tri-party repo, the clearing bank, 
instead of the counterparties, is responsible for the settlement 
of funds and collateral. In addition, specific collateral does not 
have to be allocated when the counterparties agree on the 
transaction amount. Also, many different pieces of collateral 
can be cleared together. Most MBS repos are tri-party 
transactions, as the transfer of MBS collateral, which typically 
consists of various heterogeneous securities, is potentially very 
burdensome.19
 3.  Data and Regression Framework
Our regression framework is as follows:20
TIO - MBS repo ratei spread  = 
   ,
where the subscript i represents the TIO auction number. We 
analyze auctions after TIO became an official Treasury cash 
management tool (those after no. 27) through February 2006, 
for a total of 166 auctions. Auctions held in this sample period 
are more similar to the way in which TIO auctions are likely to 
be structured and conducted in the future than auctions held 
19Special thanks to John McGowan for his insights into DVP and tri-party 
repos. For more on repo markets, see Meulendyke (1998, pp. 101-4). 
20The data on term investment auctions studied here are publicly available. 
See <http://www.wrightson.com/treasury/data/tio> (registration required) 
or <http://www.fms.treas.gov/tip>. These websites contain information 
on dates of announcement, auction, placement, and maturity; the amount 
auctioned; and the TIO auction award rate (the TIO rate). Comparable 
MBS repo rates are calculated from the opening MBS repo rate, which 
can be obtained via Bloomberg. 
αβ 1X1 i , …β N XNi , εi ++ + +
εi N ∼ 0 σε
2 , ()
during the pilot program. For example, TIO auctions now 
occur more frequently than they did during the pilot program. 
X1,…,XN represent the independent variables that influence 
the TIO-MBS repo rate spread (the spread). These include the 
size of the term investment auction and the term length. The 
coefficients to be estimated are represented by   and the  , 
and   represents a random error term. 
One complication when calculating comparable market 
rates is that MBS repo rates are not observed for term intervals 
other than overnight, one week, two weeks, etc., so exact 
comparisons of rates are not possible for TIO term lengths of 
two to six days, eight to thirteen days, etc. In addition, implied 
forward rates are the appropriate benchmark because TIO 
funds are placed on the next business day after the day of 
auction. In contrast, a repo transaction typically starts on the 
trade date. 
We calculate comparable MBS repo rates in two steps. First, 
we compute repo rates for a length of time equal to t+k days, 
where t is the number of days from auction to placement and k 
is the term length.21 We calculate these rates by linearly 
interpolating comparable rates using the MBS repo term 
structure. 
For example, TIO no. 54 was auctioned on September 14, 
2004, was issued on September 15, 2004, and matured on 
September 27, 2004, for a term length of twelve days, so that 
t = 1 and k = 12. The one-week MBS repo rate on the day of 
auction, September 14, 2004, was 1.55 percent and the two-
week MBS repo rate was 1.62 percent. The difference between 
these two rates (.07 percent) is multiplied by the number of 
days within the seven-day interval between two weeks and one 
week that is covered by t+k, (13-7)/7.22 This product is added 
to the one-week MBS repo rate to arrive at the thirteen-day 
MBS repo rate for TIO no. 54 (see Chart 7):
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Rt+k = R13 = 1.55 percent + .07 percent ∗(6/7) = 1.61 percent.
Second, implied forward rates must be calculated. The 
forward rate is the proper comparison rate because TIO 
investments are placed on the next business day after auction. 
To calculate the comparable MBS repo rate for a given TIO 
auction, fk, we use:
(1) ,
where Ro/n represents the overnight MBS repo rate, and 
overnight is defined as the next business day. Thus, for TIO 
no. 54, Ro/n on September 14, 2004, was 1.5 percent, and given 
the calculation of R13 to be 1.61 percent, we substitute values 
into equation 1:
.
22Note that for t+k<7, the interval will typically be six days (seven days for a 
one-week transaction minus one day for an overnight transaction). The proper 
interval will also be affected by weekends and holidays. For example, an 
overnight transaction conducted on a Friday will be for three days, assuming 























Therefore, the comparable MBS repo rate for TIO no. 54 is:
MBS repo rate54 = f12 = .01619, or 1.619 percent.
We present summary statistics for the variables in Table 3. 
For the sample period, the average spread is negative, at 
-6.14 basis points. The average TIO investment is for $5.98 bil-
lion for a term of eight days. While the Treasury only began 
announcing and auctioning term investments on the same day 
in 2005, 28.3 percent of term investments in the sample were 
announced and auctioned on the same day. 
Chart 8 depicts TIO and MBS repo rates. Consistent with 
the negative average spread, the MBS repo rate typically trades 
slightly above the TIO rate. The spread between the two rates is 
also plotted in the chart. The largest spread was 8.8 basis points 
for TIO no. 125 and the smallest spread was -24.5 basis points 
for TIO no. 70. While the spread is typically negative, there are 
a number of cases where it is positive. There does not appear to 
be any obvious trend in the spread over time despite the growth 
of the TIO program. 
In terms of expected signs for the regression coefficients, as 
more TIO funds are auctioned (the supply of term investments 
increases), assuming a downward-sloping demand curve, the 
TIO rate is expected to fall. Therefore, the spread is expected to 
narrow or become more negative, so the size of the auction is 
expected to be negatively related to the spread.23 The amount 






TIO-TT&L rate spread (basis points) 16.34 7.12
TIO-MBS repo rate spread (basis points) -6.14 6.99
Size (billions of dollars) 5.98 3.74
Term (days) 8.01 4.36
Term investments outstanding
  on day of placement (billions of dollars) 14.99 13.02
Days since last TIO auction 5.04 7.12
1 (announcement day = auction day) 0.283 0.452
1 (first auction if two auctions on same day) 0.054 0.227
1 (second auction if two auctions on same day) 0.054 0.227
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The number of observations is 166. TIO is term investment 
option; TT&L is Treasury Tax and Loan program; MBS is mortgage-
backed security.28 An Examination of Treasury Term Investment Interest Rates
Chart 8
Term Investment Option (TIO) Rate Compared with
Mortgage-Backed-Security (MBS) Repo Rate
Sources: Author’s calculations; U.S. Treasury Department
(<http://www.fms.treas.gov/tip>); Bloomberg.
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negative relationship with the spread, as banks are expected to bid 
less aggressively as more of their allocated collateral is exchanged 
for TIO funds.24 The need for funding assets will also generally be 
reduced by prior TIO awards. As the auctioned amount can differ 
from the amount actually placed (on rare occasions), the 
auctioned amount is used in the regressions because this is the 
amount on which banks are bidding.25 Because the benchmark 
rate is for the same term length, it is not clear that longer term 
lengths should have any relationship with the spread. We also 
analyze the number of days since the last auction. More frequent 
auctions are generally associated with more TIO funds out-
standing, so more time between auctions is expected to be 
positively related to the spread. However, this coefficient should 
be interpreted carefully. 
In addition, in the sample period the Treasury occasionally 
compressed the TIO auction schedule by announcing and 
auctioning term investments on the same day. We investigate 
the relationship between a compressed schedule and the spread 
using a dummy variable for auctions announced and auctioned 
on the same day. This coefficient is expected to be negative if 
23For Treasury debt auctions, Seligman (2006), Fleming (2002), Simon (1991, 
1994), and Duffee (1996) find that increases in the size of issuance lead to 
higher yields (lower prices for Treasury debt). 
24When two auctions occur on the same day, we set the amount outstanding 
for the second (higher numbered) auction to include the amount in the first 
auction. The higher numbered auction will have a later closing time. 
25This scenario can occur for a variety of reasons. For example, the announced 
amount for TIO no. 137 was $3 billion, but because of a collateral deficiency 
only $2.96 billion was placed  (<http://www.fms.treas.gov/tip/auctions/
HistoricalFinal05.pdf>). 
banks bid less aggressively when they have less time to prepare 
for an auction. The Treasury has also occasionally held two 
auctions for different amounts and term lengths on the same 
day. A casual observation of the data suggests that the rate for 
the second auction of a multiple-auction day is low compared 
with the rate for the first auction. Dummy variables for days of 
the week of an auction are also investigated. 
4. Regression Results
Column 1 of Table 4 presents a basic specification with only an 
intercept, the size of the TIO auction, and the term length. The size 
of the TIO auction is negatively related to the spread, so an 
increase in supply leads to lower bids. The term length is positively 
related to the spread. All coefficients are statistically significant.
Column 2 adds other explanatory variables and represents 
the preferred specification. For the other variables, we add 
quadratic and cubic terms for the term length as well as a 
dummy variable for one-day TIOs. A casual observation of the 
data shows that the six TIO offerings with one-day term lengths 
in the sample resulted in relatively low spreads. The dummy 
variable for one-day terms explicitly controls for these 
auctions. As expected, one-day term lengths result in very poor 
outcomes for the Treasury.26 The linear term coefficient is now 
larger in magnitude and still statistically significant. The 
squared term coefficient is negative, while the cubic term 
coefficient is positive. 
Holding all other variables at zero, we plot in Chart 9 the effect 
of term length on the spread. The effect of increasing term length 
is greatest for lengths of one to four days. For term lengths of five 
to sixteen days, predicted spreads are close to zero, and the effect 
of increasing term length is not large in magnitude. Beyond 
sixteen-day terms, the cubic term starts to dominate and the effect 
of increasing term length starts to climb again. Overall, for small 
auction sizes, the chart shows that for term lengths of five to 
nineteen days, the Treasury appears to receive an interest rate 
26When a dummy variable for two-day term investments was added, its 
coefficient was negative but not significant.
Overall, for small auction sizes . . . for 
term lengths of five to nineteen days,
the Treasury appears to receive an 
interest rate comparable to market rates.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 29
comparable to market rates. We note that the effect on the spread 
for term lengths greater than sixteen days should be interpreted 
with caution, because—as Chart 5 shows—only ten offerings were 
for term lengths of more than sixteen days. 
For term lengths of one to four days, the impact on the 
spread may be associated with the more cumbersome process of 
transferring TIO collateral compared with MBS repo collateral. 
As we discussed, the settlement of TIO transactions with 
Table 4
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: TIO-MBS Repo Rate Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -0.068 -0.123 -0.105 -0.132 -0.136
(-4.424) (-3.745) (-3.194) (-4.326) (-3.524)
Size -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(-2.538) (-3.936) (-3.784) (-3.728) (-3.858)
Term   0.004 0.035 0.036 0.033 0.038
(3.328) (3.331) (3.171) (3.067) (3.269)
Term2 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(-2.934) (-2.762) (-2.871) (-3.028)
Term3 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(2.705) (2.576) (2.788) (2.881)
1 (term = 1) -0.059 -0.065 -0.058 -0.040
(-2.530) (-2.601) (-2.534) (-1.452)
Term investments outstanding
  on day of placement -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.029) (-2.687) (-1.653)
Days since last TIO auction 0.006 0.008 0.005
(1.988) (3.334) (1.802)










1 (announcement day = auction day) 0.008
(0.513)
1 (first auction if two auctions on same day) -0.0002
(-0.009)




Adjusted R2 0.104 0.272 0.249 0.266 0.287
Durbin-Watson 1.59 1.39 1.41 1.42 1.41
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors. The number of observations is 166. TIO is term investment option;
MBS is mortgage-backed security.30 An Examination of Treasury Term Investment Interest Rates
noncommercial loans pledged as collateral is essentially via 
delivery-versus-payment.27 However, MBS repos are predomi-
nantly settled via tri-party, the more operationally efficient 
method of settlement. Accordingly, depository institutions 
may consider the transfer of TIO collateral back and forth 
for term lengths of less than five days to be particularly 
burdensome, leading to low relative TIO rates for short term 
lengths.28 
As expected, the coefficient on the amount of term invest-
ments outstanding on the day of placement is negative, but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant.29 The magnitude of this 
coefficient is also smaller than the coefficient for size of auction. 
The number of days since the last TIO auction is positive and 
significant; the coefficient on the quadratic term is negative and 
significant at the 90 percent level. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 present results in which the 
number of days since the last TIO auction and the amount of 
term investments outstanding, respectively, are deleted from 
the specification. The interaction of these variables may be 
confounding their coefficients in column 2. As we discussed, 
more frequent auctions generally are associated with more TIO 
funds outstanding. In column 3, the variables for the number of 
days since the last auction are deleted and the amount of term 
27At this time, it is not clear whether the Treasury has the legal authority to 
engage in tri-party transactions.
28For a given cost of transferring collateral, the average cost (per day) is larger 
for shorter term lengths.
29This amount does not include the amount being placed.
investments outstanding is retained. Whereas in column 2 the 
coefficient for the amount of term investments outstanding is 
insignificant, the coefficient in column 3 is now statistically 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
In column 4, the variables for the number of days since the 
last auction are retained and the amount of term investments 
outstanding is deleted. Compared with their values in column 2, 
the coefficients for both the linear and quadratic terms for the 
number of days since the last auction are larger in magnitude 
and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Furthermore, an F-test of the null hypothesis that these 
three coefficients are jointly equal to zero can be rejected at the 
99 percent confidence level.30 As a result, we retain these three 
variables in the preferred specification in column 2.
4.1 Additional Issues
Table 4, column 5, presents a fuller specification with 
additional variables for the day of the week of auction, cases 
when TIO funds are announced and auctioned on the same 
day, dummy variables for days with multiple auctions, and a 
time trend (in decimal years).31 None of the additional 
coefficients is statistically significant. Therefore, column 2 
represents the preferred specification.
The insignificant time trend suggests that spreads did not 
narrow over the sample period. Higher order terms for the time 
trend (not presented) also were insignificant. The coefficient on 
the dummy variable for auctions announced and auctioned on 
the same day is positive, but insignificant. This result suggests 
that compressing the auction schedule does not negatively affect 
the Treasury in terms of the spread; banks appear to be 
indifferent to more advance notice of a TIO auction. 
In addition, coefficients on the dummy variables for days 
with multiple auctions are not significant.32 Note that the 
amount of term investments outstanding is always greater for 
the second auction on a day with multiple auctions. Also, the 
number of days since the last auction is always zero for the 
second auction. While the magnitude of the coefficient for the 
second auction on a multiple-auction day suggests that the 
Treasury may need to be somewhat cautious in conducting 
multiple auctions on the same day, the statistical insignifi-
cance of the coefficient implies that this variable does 
30The test statistic has a value of 6.82, which exceeds the 1 percent F3,157
critical value of 3.78. 
31Thus, the time trend takes on a value of 1 on November 21, 2004, one year 
after the sample period began.
32In the sample, there are nine occasions on which two auctions occurred on 
the same day.
Intercept and Term Length Coefficients; 
Other Variables Set to Zero
Source: Author’s calculations.
 








19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Term length (number of days)
 FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2007 31
not add much explanatory value beyond the effects of the 
amount of term investments outstanding and the time since 
the last auction. 
5. Conclusion
This article considers whether the interest rates received by the 
Treasury through TIO auctions are comparable to market 
rates. Central to our study is an analysis of the spread between 
rates on TIO auctions and rates on mortgage-backed-security 
repos. We study the 166 TIO auctions held from November 
2003, when TIO became an official Treasury cash management 
tool, through February 2006.
We find that for small auction sizes, TIO interest rates and 
MBS repo rates are comparable for auctions with term lengths33 
of five days or more. However, the Treasury tends to receive 
lower TIO rates relative to market rates when term lengths are 
of shorter durations. We also find that the spread between the 
TIO rate and the MBS repo rate is negatively related to auction 
size. Finally, banks appear to be indifferent to more advance 
notice of TIO auctions. We base this conclusion on our finding 
that TIO interest rates are not adversely affected by a more 
compressed auction schedule, whereby the Treasury 
announces and auctions TIO funds on the same day.
These findings may be of interest to a variety of market 
participants. For instance, the Treasury would be interested in 
whether its term investments are receiving a rate of return 
comparable to market rates. In addition, those who study 
Treasury auctions may find our results informative, because 
TIO auctions vary along more dimensions than do typical 
Treasury debt auctions and hence can offer new insight. 
Finally, our work may be of interest to other central banks, as 
the management of treasury funds affects the level of bank 
reserves and thus the conduct of monetary policy.33 
33Different countries have different frameworks for managing government 
funds. For example, in Japan all government funds are held at the central bank 
and no funds are held at banking institutions. See Bank of Japan (2004).References
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